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THROUGH THE GREED, IGNORANCE, 
AND POWER BEHIND THE lAW, A 
PEOPLE STILL REMAIN 
ALICE ENG* 
WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED 
STATES. By MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE. New York: Random 
House. 1997. Pp. 304. 
America's historical inability and unwillingness to understand the 
distinct culture and beliefs of Native American people are associated 
with the ineffectiveness of legal redress of Native American claims by 
the Indian Claims Commission. l Although the horrendous maltreat-
ment of the Native American population by the Federal Government 
in past centuries is now common knowledge,2 what few people recog-
nize is that the abuse of Native American dignity continues today.3 
Socially and legally, America remains incapable of understanding the 
cultural differences between Native Americans and Anglo-Americans.4 
This lack of comprehension, especially surrounding the way each cul-
ture views land and treaties, precludes recognition and awareness of 
these differences in the development of legal redress of Native Ameri-
can claims.5 Although technically classified as past grievances, the trick-
ery and deception that characterized the Government's actions against 
Native Americans are continually validated by law.6 With every obstacle 
to legal and moral vindication that Native American people are forced 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I See MICHAEL LIEDER &JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED 
STATES 265-69 (1997). The time period from 1946 to 1978 marked the existence of the Commis-
sion whose purpose was to finally decide Native American claims against the Federal Government, 
not only for those relying on legal principles, but also for those based on moral considerations. 
See id. at 65-66. 
2 See id. at 255. 
3 See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 753, 
754 (1992) [hereinafter Newton, Courts of the Conqueror]. 
4 See Tracy N. Zlock, Note, The Native American Tribe as a Client: An Ethical Analysis, 10 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 159, 166 (1996). 
5 See id. 
6 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 68; Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 
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to surmount in their search for justice, in whatever form it exists,? 
Native Americans are still degraded. 
With a compelling perspective that approaches Native American 
legal issues from both a social and legal viewpoint, Michael Lieder and 
Jake Page unfold the legal tale of Native American claims in the 
context of the human drama of fundamental dignity and respect.s 
Appreciating the correlation and interconnection of societal values 
with the laws created by the people spawned by this same society, the 
authors seek to expose the cyclical nature of the effects and influences 
of the law amongst those who create it and those who must obey it.9 
Although the law is molded by society, not all of those who have a hand 
in shaping it are subject to it. As a result, a gap in comprehension 
develops between those who create the laws and those for whom the 
laws are created. While such a gap may not determine whether the laws 
are obeyed, it diminishes the law's effectiveness; effectiveness is based 
not solely on obedience of the law but also on the respect accorded 
it. 1o Respect for the law is not a matter of right, for all that the law 
declares is not always right or fair, but a matter of merit since people 
will respect only that which respects them. 
Michael Lieder and Jake Page, a lawyer and a professional writer 
respectively, portray a more complete story of Native American claims 
by combining the social elements of culture and religion with the legal 
elements of rights.u Through the illustration of the struggle of the 
Chiricahua Apaches in their tedious and tormenting path to and 
through the American legal system for redress of wrongs committed 
754. The abuse Native American tribes previously suffered at the hands of the Government 
continues today, in substance if not form, since the laws remain in the Government's promulga-
tion. See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 754. However, "Indian tribes have 
refused to disappear despite the genocide of the 18th and 19th centuries, the neglect of the first 
half of the 20th century, and the genocide-at-law that continued well into this century." Id. 
7 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 90-91. 
8 See id. at v-vi. 
9 See id. 
IU See id. at 265-69. Native American tribes did not understand the Anglo-American concept 
of "property" and thus did not respect the laws governing property as a commodity to be bought 
and sold as reflected in the words of Tecumseh, "Sell a country! Why not sell the air, the clouds 
and the great sea, as well as the earth? Did not the Great Spirit make them all for the use of his 
children?" Id. at 269. 
II See id. at vi. Before entering law school, Michael Lieder spent four years working for two 
of the principal lawyers discussed in the book during their representation of tribes under the 
Indian Claims Commission Act. See id. Jake Page is not a lawyer but a professional writer, whose 
mission was to ensure that the legal analyses of the book were understandable to non-lawyers 
while unfolding the human dramas underlying each of the cases for the reader. See id. 
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by the Government against them, Lieder and Page detail the failure of 
the Indian Claims Commission to accomplish the goals under which 
it was created: to make amends for the wrongs committed against 
Native American tribes and to put an end to their claims once and for 
al1.12 In unveiling the failure of the Indian Claims Commission, the 
authors demonstrate two points. First, they highlight the enduring 
degradation of Native Americans who have encountered continuous 
obstacles and barriers to their legal and moral claims, which are an 
extension of the humiliation they confronted in their early dealings 
with the Government. 13 Secondly, Lieder and Page provide an analysis 
of the fundamental problems with the Indian Claims Commission Act 
through the illustration of claims brought by Native American tribes 
which exposed the limitations of the American legal system.14 These 
limitations primarily resulted from the narrow white American cultural 
vision afforded the "translation of Indian culture into the language of 
the law."15 The word most difficult to translate accurately from Native 
American culture into Anglo law is "justice" since Native American 
tribes could find no justice in the purely monetary awards granted to 
them in the shadow of a hollow victory. 
The Chiricahua Apaches provide a prime example of how resolute 
Native American tribes can be in their struggle for justice, to accept 
not just what the legislature and the courts are willing to give them but 
to fight until they receive all that they deserve.16 Final resolution of 
their claims will result only when the law becomes flexible enough to 
encompass the historical and cultural implications these claims have 
legally as well as morally.17 By understanding the particular culture and 
history of Native Americans, lawmakers could approach a level of 
comprehension of and affinity to the real dilemma that Native Ameri-
cans face. IS Only then could lawmakers adequately address the under-
12 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at x, 146. 
USee id. at 89-92. 
14 See id. at 266-72. 
15 Zlock, supra note 4, at 166. 
16 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 4. Although the land claim of the Chiricahua Apaches 
was very important, they felt that the time they spent imprisoned by the Government was 
paramount. See id. at 108. The Chiricahua Apaches pursued their imprisonment claim, which the 
Government contended was individual, not tribal in nature, even though no previous decision 
precisely addressed the issue before the Commission. See id. at 105-D8. 
17 See Zlock, supra note 4, at 166-67. 
18 See id. Comprehension of cultural differences is essential to effective representation and 
legal redress. See id. Otherwise the motives and objectives of tribal litigation consistent with Native 
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lying moral and practical concerns of Native American legal claims.19 
The spirit of the Native American claim embodies the need to be 
reunited with the land from which Native Americans draw their iden-
tity as a people.20 Additionally, this spirit encompasses Native Ameri-
cans' need for human respect which mandates that the Government 
acknowledges fault for the wrongs committed against them.21 But like 
the spirit of Native American people, whether united or divided, the 
spirit of the claim will not be conquered until wild justice is realized; 
for that which grows in the wild has the most tenacious roots. 
Part I of this book review will provide a general overview and 
discussion of the unique cultural perspective of Native Americans and 
the tensions inherent in the Anglo-American/Native American rela-
tionship. Part II will discuss the history and legislative intent behind 
the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946. Part III will outline the 
obstacles Native American tribes faced in complying with the Act's 
requirements. In Part IV, the various types of claims brought by Native 
American tribes will be analyzed to reveal their underlying problems. 
The issues and concerns raised by Lieder and Page, while not new, are 
insightful to demonstrate the improvement potential inherent in the 
process of trial and error that can be made in the nature of law in the 
Native American context.22 
I. NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURE AND ANGLO-AMERICAN/NATIVE 
AMERICAN TENSION 
Fundamental to the examination of the inadequacy of the Indian 
Claims Commission to address Native American claims is the under-
standing of the distinctive cultural characteristics and lifestyles of Na-
tive American people before governmental intrusion.23 Arranged in 
American culture will continue to be considered insignificant and any legal satisfaction the tribes 
receive will offer no real cultural and moral satisfaction. See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. at 159. To Native American tribes, land could not be separated from the very essence 
of who they were as a people. See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 269. "[W]hen the United States 
took part or all of a tribe's aboriginal land, it didn't just take something of monetary value; rather, 
it took a crucial means for the tribe to maintain its identity." Id. The Pueblo of Taos was the first 
Native American tribe to seek return of their land. See id. at 193. The bowl-shaped watershed 
surrounding Blue Lake, the center of their religion, was believed to be the place where the souls 
of the dead retreated and from where life is given to the people of today. See id. The area was 
finally returned to the Taos Indians in December 1970. See id. at 194. 
21 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 92-93. 
22 See id. at 265-69. 
2~ See id. at 268-69. 
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relatively small groups that included a handful of extended families, 
the Chiricahua Apaches received instruction and direction from 
influential heads of family, but decisions were made communally.24 
Rather than politically organized around centralized authority, the 
Chiricahua Apaches were united under one name and differentiated 
from other tribes by common language and customs.25 United by com-
mon language and custom, the Chiricahuas also shared a common 
vision of life which revolved around their special relationship with the 
land.26 The land represented the foundation of their history, survival, 
and cultural influences such that their tribal identity could not be 
divided into economic, political, or religious dimensions.27 Therefore, 
land was not property to be sold or traded, valued only for the mone-
tary rewards it could bring, but derived its value from the historical 
and spiritual meaning that created tribal identity.28 
While Native American cultural beliefs are important to compre-
hending the types of claims Native American tribes brought before the 
Commission, these beliefs are equally significant to understanding the 
attitude with which these tribes brought their claims.29 The Apache 
code of honor demanded that each individual take responsibility for 
his or her own actions.30 Fueled by the fighting rage of indeh, meaning 
dead, in their pursuit of wild justice, Geronimo, the military leader and 
figurehead of the Chiricahua Apaches, and his warriors were bound 
by the Chiricahua spirit to continue fighting and resisting as part of 
the Apache code of life.31 Life and honor were related principles 
behind the Apaches' vision of existence.32 The Apache code of life 
governed the actions they are compelled to take, while their code of 
honor commanded the attitude with which their actions were taken.33 
24 See id. at 6-8. 
25 See id. at 7. 
26 See Zlock, supra note 4, at 166-68. 
In our day each remaining acre is a promise that we will still be here tomorrow. 
Were we paid a thousand times the market value of our lost holdings, still the 
payment would not suffice. Money never mothered the Indian people, as the land 
has mothered them, nor have any people become more closely attached to the land, 
religiously and traditionally. 
Id. at 168 (quoting the Declaration oflndian Purpose). 
27 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 268-69. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 97. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 4. 
32 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 4, 117. 
33 See id. The Apache code of life spurred them to continue fighting even though they knew 
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Thus, when Geronimo resisted the Federal Government after it had 
repeatedly cheated and deceived his people of the land it promised 
them, he considered the implications his actions would have not only 
for himself but also for his fellow people.34 For all practical intent and 
purposes, it was pointless, if not impossible, to distinguish between 
individual tribulation and that suffered by the tribe. 35 The Chiricahua 
Apaches were a people of principle and honor, but most importantly 
they were one people united.36 The fate of one lay in the hands of 
another.37 
Once the rationale behind Native American beliefs is understood, 
the opposition between these beliefs and Anglo-American legal con-
cepts can be examined. The tension arising between these two con-
cepts stems from the position Native American tribes enjoyed as sover-
eign groups, a status which the Government stripped them of through 
one significant legislative act.38 Before the arrival of European nation-
als onto American land, Native American people controlled their ac-
tions and lived under their own guidelines.39 As the United States 
Government developed and gained power with the passage of time, it 
trampled the sovereignty of Native American tribes.40 The loss of sov-
ereign status resulted not only in a limitation of actions for Native 
Americans, but more importantly in an annihilation of autonomy and 
control over their own fateY 
they could not win, while their code of honor required them to take responsibility for their actions 
once they were taken. See id. For the Apaches, every action has a consequence; thus life and 
honor are inextricably intertwined. See id. 
54 See id. at 97. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 97. The fate of imprisonment of the individual 
Chiricahua Apaches actually seemed to lie in the hands of two others, Geronimo and the Federal 
Government. See id. at 28, 97. Due to his rebellion; Geronimo implicated his fellow Chiricahuas 
in his eyes as well as those of the Government. See id. However, the Federal Government 
imprisoned all the Chiricahuas, even those who took no part in the outbreak or resistance. See 
id. During this imprisonment, over half of the Chiricahua population was born into captivity as 
prisoners of war. See id. at 28, 43. 
58 See Susan Lope, Note, Indian Giver: The IUusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native 
American Land Claims, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 331, 333-36 (1994). Congress passed the Indian 
Department Appropriations Act on March 3, 1871. See id. The Act stripped Native American tribes 
of their sovereignty by declaring "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United 
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom 
the United States may contract by treaty." Id. at 336. 
59 See id. at 333-34. 
40 See id. at 334-35. 
41 See id. at 335-37. 
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Principles in Anglo-American legal theory failed to adjust to the 
unique circumstances and position of Native Americans.42 While the 
Anglo-American legal system has long imposed specific duties and 
strict standards of conduct for private trustees, it has ignored the 
consequences of such trust relationships for a once sovereign people.43 
In order for the United States to advance its own interests it needed 
to subordinate those of Native Americans.44 Thus a conflict of interest 
was created.45 The Federal Government declared itself the trustee for 
Native American funds received from the sale of the rights to resources 
on Native American land to non-Indians.46 Life before reservations for 
Native Americans consisted of absolute control and autonomy to dis-
pose of and use their land.47 But once the Government denounced 
Native American sovereignty and assumed management powers over 
tribal lands, resources, and money, Native Americans had practically 
no input in the management of these resources.48 The fact that the 
Government could just assert for itself such a position of control and 
dominion over a proud and independent people intensified the al-
ready unstable relationship between the two groupS.49 While Anglo-
American legal concepts exacerbated the tension between the Govern-
ment and Native Americans, this tension escalated even further when 
the Government ignored its own legal concepts. 50 Inherent in Anglo-
42 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 116-17. Although the theory of eminent domain is 
straightforward in stating that the Government has the power to take private lands without the 
landowner's agreement, the Fifth Amendment guarantees the landowner a recourse. See id. 
However, the differences between Indian and non-Indian eminent domain claims illustrate the 
specific situation of the Native American tribe. See id. Included in these differences are the lack 
of title and definitive boundaries to the aboriginal land of the Native Americans, their disagree-
ment with the Anglo-American concept of land ownership, and the cultural value and relationship 
of the land to their people. See id. 
43 See id. at 230; Lope, supra note 38, at 337-38. A major characteristic that set the scene for 
the trust relationships between the United States and Native American tribes was the fact that 
the Government was the largely self-appointed trustee for the Native Americans, assuming the 
role without their consent. See Lope, supra note 38, at 336-37. 
44 See Lope, supra note 38, at 336-38. 
45 See id. 
46 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 230. 
47 See Lope, supra note 38, at 334-35. 
48 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 230. 
49 See id.; Lope, supra note 38, at 336-37. The relationship between the United States and 
Native Americans had been marred by the United States inability or unwillingness to keep its 
promises. See Lope, supra note 38, at 337. Therefore, Native Americans have had a long and hard 
battle to redress even the most basic of claims. See id. 
50 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 218. For example, the Anglo-American legal system 
imposes significant duties and strict standards of conduct on private trustees. See id. at 230. As 
self-appointed trustees for the Native American tribes, the United States Government was bound 
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American law is the principle that "every individual has an obligation 
not to interfere with the freedom of another, except in certain defined 
circumstances. "51 However these circumstances may be defined, justice 
mandates that the innocent should not be punished for crimes they 
have not committed. The Government violated this principle when it 
imprisoned the entire group of Chiricahua Apaches for the crimes 
committed by a few. 52 In this manner, the tension is attributable to the 
lack of honor and honesty the Government demonstrated in its rela-
tions with the Chiricahuas. 
Finally, Anglo-American/Native American tension is caused by the 
lack of comprehension of and flexibility for different beliefs and cul-
tures in Anglo-American law.53 The theory of eminent domain provides 
that the Government has the power to take private lands without the 
landowner's agreement.54 To balance such a broad power, the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees that a landowner is entitled to the value of the 
property at the date of the taking plus the interest calculated from that 
date to the date of the award.55 However, in considering the obstacles 
to establishing proof of ownership by legal title to land, which Native 
Americans lacked since their land was aboriginal in nature, such An-
glo-American legal concepts failed to account for differences in culture 
and circumstance.56 Additionally, the view that the compensated taking 
of land was legitimate completely ignored the fact that land was more 
than a financial interest for Native Americans;57 to them the land was 
their life blood and nowhere in the law is that recognized. Tensions 
between Anglo-American legal concepts and the Native American cul-
ture forced to fit within those confines are caused by power discrepan-
cies, disregard for basic human integrity, and lack of understanding. It 
is not difficult to imagine why Native Americans are always on their 
guard when it comes to the Government. Betrayal once may be for-
given but betrayal again will never be forgotten. 
by traditional trustee obligations not to divert assets of the trust to its own benefit or that of third 
parties, to charge a fair price for the lease of trust resources, and to keep account for its 
management of trust assets. See id. at 230. The Court of Claims and the Indian Claims Commission 
found that the Government did not fulfill its obligations and duties as a trustee. See id. at 233, 
244-47. 
51Id. 
52 See id. at 28, 43. 
53 See id. at 26!K>9; Zlock, supra note 4, at 166. 
54 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 116. 
55 See id. at 116-17. 
56 See id. at 117. 
57 See id. at 116-17, 269. 
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Once united under the name of Chiricahua Apaches, the Fort Sill 
and Mescalero Apaches share a history, a culture, a language, and an 
experience of imprisonment that will always bind them to one an-
other.58 Along different paths, these two tribal groups fought through 
the legal realm for redress of their claims only to find that they even-
tually arrived at the same place.59 Below is a brief overview of each 
group individually as they currently exist but this review will show how 
they previously existed under the name Chiricahuas. 
The Fort Sill Apaches were named for the location of the reserva-
tion on which they even tually settled and remained.60 During the nine-
teen years they were confined as prisoners of war on the Fort Sill 
Reservation,61 the Chiricahuas were converted from a life where sub-
sistence depended on hunting and gathering to one where agriculture 
and raising cattle were the staples of survival. 62 At the end of their 
imprisonment, the Fort Sill Apaches were promised allotments of 160 
acre parcels, which not all of them received.63 Allotment was a federal 
Indian policy from 1880 to 1920 which signified a departure from the 
tribal way of life in favor of a push toward individualism.51 Although 
less tied to the tribal group, exposed to Christianity, and better edu-
cated, the Fort Sill Apaches clung to their tribal heritage through 
informal family gatherings on the weekends and the singing of the 
Lonesome Songs, a reflection and yearning for a life they no longer 
had and some would never know.65 
While the Fort Sill Apaches were forging a new life in the Anglo 
world, the Mescalero Apaches were striving to return to a land and life 
they once had.66 Upon arriving at the Mescalero Reservation in New 
58 See id. at 6-7,49, 82. 
59 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 82, 113-14. 
60 See id. at 40, 78. 
61 See id. at 40, 49. The Chiricahua Apaches arrived at the Fort Sill, Oklahoma Reservation 
in 1894 and were not given the freedom to leave until the end of 1912 when the Chiricahuas 
decided individually whether they wished to remain at the Fort Sill Reservation or to head 
Southwest to Mescalero. See id. 
62 See id. at 7,71,77. 
63 See id. at 76-77. Among those who received their 160 acre allotments, many found the 
parcels unusable because they became increasingly smaller with each division among all familial 
heirs as required by the intestate deaths of Native Americans. See id. at 77. The divided and various 
interests held in one parcel of land complicated the issue of who would live on or farm it. See id. 
64 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 40, 77-78. 
65 See id. at 78-79. 
66 See id. at 47, 70. The Mescalero Apaches were so named for the Mescalero Reservation 
they settled on and the consolidation of the various tribes on this reservation resulted in the 
creation of the Mescalero Tribe. See id. at 70, 74. The move to the Mescalero Reservation meant 
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Mexico, the Mescalero Apaches experienced the isolation that came 
with starting over.67 Their Government-imposed training in ranching 
and agriculture ill-prepared the Mescalero Apaches for life in an area 
where the growing season was too short to sustain consistent yields in 
oats, their only cash crop, and where the herd was too small to produce 
sufficient income or jobs.68 Dependent upon the Government for hous-
ing and forced to live in a geographic area not entirely of their own 
choosing, the Mescalero Apaches soon found themselves destitute.69 
However, under the options presented in the Indian Reorganization 
Act, the Mescalero Reservation adopted a constitution and bylaws 
which effectively established the Mescalero Tribe.70 The tribal council 
was composed of a ten-person business committee.71 This new legal 
identity voluntarily assumed by the separate tribal groups on the Mes-
calero Reservation implicitly required that each distinct tribal and 
cultural unit relinquish their separate ethnic identities to gain recog-
nition as a political group. 72 
II. INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION ACT (1946) 
On August 13, 1946, the Indian Claims Commission Act was 
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Harry Truman.73 
With unprecedented value and effect, this Act granted the Commission 
the jurisdiction to hear any claim brought by any "Indian tribe, band, 
or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within the 
territorial limits of the United States or Alaska" that accrued on or 
before the date of the passage of the bill. 74 Technically, Native Ameri-
can tribes would be placed on the same ground as all other Americans 
the continuation of a tribal way of life on tribally owned lands with other Indians. See id. at 47. 
There were nearly a half million acres to live on with mountains, grass, streams, deer, and elk. 
See id. at 70. 
67 See id. at 70-72, 74. 
68 See id. at 71. 
69 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 70-71. 
70 See id. at 74. 
71 See id. 
72 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 74; William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal Acknowledgment of 
American Indian Tribes: The Historical Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 
336 (1990). Tribes acknowledged under 25 C.F.R. 83 are established as an ''Indian'' tribe only 
within the meaning under federal law which does not account for the numerous definitions of 
"tribe" that exist in an ethnic sense. See Quinn, supra, at 336. 
73 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 64. 
74Indian Claims Commission Act §§ 2, 24 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a, 1505, 
omitted from Code upon Commission termination on Sept. 30, 1978), quoted in LIEDER & PAGE, 
supra note 1, at 64-65,82. 
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in terms of opportunity and access to bring property and contract 
claims against the Federal Government.75 Among the barriers lifted by 
the passage of the Act was the waiver of the statute of limitations and 
sovereign immunity.76 Respectively, these doctrines would have barred 
those suits not brought within a specified time period after the occur-
rence of the claim and those brought against the Government without 
its consent.77 The Act specified that claims were to be filed before the 
Commission within five years of the Commission's creation or they 
would be forever barred.78 Mter all claims were filed, the Commission 
was granted an additional five years to issue a decision.79 Similar to the 
limited remedies available to the Court of Claims, the Commission 
could only grant monetary awards.80 Development of problems con-
cerning resources to hear these claims caused the Commission's dead-
line to be extended five times beginning in 1957, in five year incre-
ments.8l In light of the problems faced by the Commission, it was not 
surprising that the Commission was ultimately dissolved in 1978.82 
The Commission's failure was partially due to its inability to satisfy 
the intent behind the Act, mainly because of the mind-set with which 
it carried out its operation.83 Some legal scholars have asserted the 
major purpose of the Indian Claims Commission Act was to eliminate 
the cloud hanging over non-Indian titles.84 In reality, the fact was that 
in 1946, tribes did not pose a threat to the land titles ofnon-Indians.85 
Perhaps by compensating Indian tribes for the land deceptively confis-
cated from them, the Government was indirectly acknowledging fault 
without directly apologizing for the wrongs it committed.86 However, 
to acknowledge fault is completely different than offering an apology 
for it. 
75 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 64-65. 
76 See id. at 52, 65-66; Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 768, 792. 
77 See id. 
7B See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 65. 
79 See id. 
BO See id. at 52-53, 27l. 
BI See id. at 65. 
B2 See id. 
B5 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 146. The Commission took on the role of a social 
welfare agency, dispersing limited compensation to tribes to ensure some recovery. See id. But 
the Commission's most important goal was putting an end to Indian claims. See id. To achieve 
this goal, they devised fictions which distorted judgments on aboriginal land claims to the point 
where they hardly resembled traditional Anglo-American notions of judicial proceedings. See id. 
B4 See id. at 175. 
B5 See id. 
B6 See id. at 116, 146. 
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Established in the aftermath of World War II, the Commission may 
have reflected the United States' sensitivity to the parallel barbarous 
treatment of racial and ethnic minorities in Europe.87 Whatever hu-
mane considerations the United States may have had in the creation 
of the Act, a practical purpose that weighed heavily in its favor was the 
final resolution of Indian claims.88 Such resolution would only be 
possible if all of the injustices suffered by Native Americans were 
heard and compensated.89 Given the nature and history of treatment 
of Native Americans by the United States Government, the essence of 
the Chiricahuas' claims against the Government centered around their 
humanitarian claim for respect and fairness in light of their twenty-
seven year imprisonment rather than on their economic claims for 
land or mismanagement of trusts.90 Anticipating that this source of 
discontent would spur Native American tribes to continue to bring 
claims and have them resolved before they could finally be put to rest, 
the Legislature inserted a "fair and honorable dealings" clause in the 
Act.91 Clause 5 of the Act provides for "claims based upon fair and 
honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law 
or equity. ''92 The Act provided for an Investigation Division to assist in 
the factual support needed for these claims in light of the difficulty 
tribes and their attorneys had in obtaining documentation and factual 
findings to support their cases.93 However, an Investigation Division was 
never established, thus resting the burden of fact-finding on attor-
neys.94 The fact that non-economic claims were quickly disposed of due 
87 See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims 
in the United States, 28 GA. L. REv. 453, 468 (1994) [hereinafter Newton, Compensation]. 
88 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 146. 
89 See id. at 108, 146. 
90 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 108; Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 
776--81. Grady Lewis, one of the lawyers for the Chiricahua Apaches, stated, "[Ilt is known by 
everyone who has the slightest knowledge of the subject that the principal claim of the Fort Sill 
Apaches grows out of their imprisonment as prisoners of war." LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 
108. 
9l See Indian Claims Commission Act § 2 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a, 1505, 
omitted from Code upon Commission termination on Sept. 30, 1978), quoted in LIEDER & PAGE, 
supra note 1, at 67. 
92Id. The Act's intentionally open-ended language allowed the Commission to apply moral 
principles across the board in order to cover the entire course of the relationship between the 
Government and the Native American tribes. See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, 
at 776-77. The Commission hoped that addressing the issues would finally put them to rest. See 
id. 
9~ See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 88-89; Newton, Compensation, supra note 87, at 468-69. 
94 See id.; Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 772-73. The Commissioner 
believed that the Investigation Division was an unfamiliar agency of questionable value. See LIEDER 
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to distinctions such as individual versus tribal claims95 and duties ex-
pressly assumed by the Government versus implied duties based upon 
actions96 illustrates how little weight the intent of the Act was given. As 
noble as the intent of the Act may have been, once in operation the 
focus of the claim always rested on the eventual outcome and the 
economic ramifications associated with it rather than on what the claim 
was really about.97 
Perhaps to an even greater degree, the failure of the Indian Claims 
Commission Act could be attributed to the inability or unwillingness 
of the Government to open its mind and vocabulary to a different 
culture and way of life.98 One of the greatest flaws of the Commission 
was its implementation of an adversarial system that operated more 
like a court than a commission that heard disputes.99 While the Ameri-
can judicial system relies upon the adversarial system to bring out the 
facts leading to the truth, Native American disputes are mediated 
among tribal members to reach a just resolution. lOo In addition to this 
difference in approach, mediation was the more sensible of the meth-
ods of adjudication given the scarcity of factual evidence and documen-
tation in these decades-old, if not centuries-old, claims.101 In light of 
the past actions of trickery and deception taken by the Government 
against Native American people, the atmosphere of distrust would only 
be exacerbated by the additional opposition and conflict inherent in 
the adversarial process. The Commission naturally gravitated toward 
the adversarial model presented in the courts as the method of adju-
& PAGE, supra note 1, at 89. Attorneys for both the Indians and the government placed little if 
any value on such a division, preferring to do their own research. See id. 
95 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 105--07. The Indian Claims Commission Act authorized 
claims to be brought "on behalf of any Indian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American 
Indians." Indian Claims Commission Act § 2 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a, 1505, omitted 
from Code upon Commission termination on Sept. 30, 1978), quoted in LIEDER & PAGE, supra 
note 1, at 105. In the Chiricahuas' imprisonment claim, Commissioner Holt declared imprison-
ment to be a violation of personal rights of individual Indians and a personal wrong committed 
against each individual Indian rather than a wrong against the tribe of which the individual is a 
member. See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 107. Therefore, he determined the claim was 
individual in nature and did not fit within the language of the Act. See id. 
96 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 217-18. Tribes could not recover under the fair and 
honorable dealings clause unless the Government had violated a duty assumed under a treaty, 
agreement, order, or statute. See id. at 217 (discussing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Commu-
nity v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194, 1197-1200 (Ct. Cl. 1970)). 
97 See id. at 92-93, 223-24. 
98 See id. at 265-69. 
99 See id. at 68, 88-89, 272. 
100 See id. at 68, 88. 
lOl See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 88-89, 269-71. 
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dication since it was "the white man's method of resolving disputes."102 
Contrary to the adversary system, mediation entailed compromise, 
negotiation, and perhaps vindication for the Indian tribes, a result the 
Government avoided at all costs.103 
Functionally similar to the Court of Claims, the Commission was 
only authorized to award monetary damages. 104 In this way, the Com-
mission completely disregarded the cultural differences in beliefs and 
life-style of the Native American tribes.105 Monetary value of property 
held no meaning for Native American tribes. lo6 Rather it was the relig-
ious and traditional connection Native Americans had to the land 
which held for them the promise that as long as they were never 
separated from the land they, as a people, would endure.107 Although 
restoration of land as a remedy would have been very limited due to 
the broad distribution of aboriginal land to non-Indians and the de-
velopment of the land that had occurred, it was a remedy that was 
possible to a limited extent. IOS The Government should have realized 
that the desire and need for their own land is so deeply embedded in 
the spirit of the Native American people that there will never be an 
end to Native American claims until the Government gets to the heart 
of the issue. No amount of money can put the hearts and minds of the 
Native American people to rest in the same way as the land their souls 
will always gravitate toward. 
On December 11,1962, the tribunal would finally hear the claims 
of the Chiricahua Apaches for the taking of their aboriginal land. log 
More than seventy-five years had passed since the Chiricahuas had 
been removed to Florida. llo In this first step toward judicial redress of 
102 See id. at 272. 
103 See id. at 93. "In many instances the government would have been better served by 
negotiated settlements. Instead, the government's attorneys not only asserted all available de-
fenses to defeat tribes' claims, but throughout most of the Commission's history contested most 
cases to the bitter end." !d. 
104 See id. at 52-53, 271. 
105 See id. at 268-69. In addition to the white man's method of adjudication, the lawyers who 
presented and decided the cases would be overwhelmingly white men and the "only remedy 
would be the white man's favorite - money." Id. at 272. 
106 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 268-69. 
107 See id.; Zlock, supra note 4, at 16~8. 
108 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 193-94, 196-97. Both the Blue Lake watershed of the 
Taos and the land of the Yakimas were held by the Government as national forest land, enabling 
the Government to return the property to these tribes. See id. at 193,197. Congress has the power 
to return all federally-held land to the Sioux. See Lope, supra note 38, at 358. 
109 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 147. 
110 See id. 
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their claims, the Chiricahuas may have believed their long wait was 
over.lll But they were wrong; it would take another sixteen years before 
litigation of the Apaches' land claim would finally be concluded.ll2 
III. OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS IN FRONT OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS 
COMMISSION 
To quality for an aboriginal land claim, a Native American tribe 
had to prove that it constituted a "tribe, band, or an identifiable group 
of Indians" that owned or occupied a particular tract of land as re-
quired under the Indian Claims Commission Act. ll3 Through subjec-
tive classifications of the Indian character, the Supreme Court arrived 
at certain definitions for "tribe" and "band".n4 A "tribe" was identified 
as a "body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a commu-
nity under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular 
though sometimes ill-defined territory. "115 Similarly, the Court defined 
a "band" as a "company of Indians not necessarily, though often, of the 
same race or tribe, but united under the same leadership in a common 
design. "116 The essential element of either definition was the concept 
that a "political unit, whether a state, a tribe, or a band, needed a 
recognized government or leadership that can command common 
action."117 Recognition of a tribe or a band in the jurisdictional sense 
necessitated such distinctions to identity and limit the groups who 
could bring claim.us Regardless of whether these Native American 
groups were legally classified as tribes or bands or other identifiable 
Indian groups, their distinct differences separated them from main-
stream Anglo-American society. Legally recognized or not, tribal iden-
tity needed no definitional parameters when it was so obviously a 
physical, behavioral, and ideological divider. 
The Court of Claims ultimately found that the best way to distin-
guish which Native American groups fit within the boundaries of the 
III See id. 
112 See id. 
lIS See Indian Claims Commission Act § 2 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a, 1505, 
omitted from Code upon Commission termination on Sept. 30,1978), quoted in LIEDER & PAGE, 
supra note 1, at 119. 
114 See Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (Ct. Cl. 1901). 
115LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 119 (discussing Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 
(Ct. Cl. 1901)). 
116Id. 
117LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 119. 
liS See id. 
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Act was to look at Congressional intent. 119 The intent behind the Act 
was to allow all tribes, bands or groups of American Indians access to 
the court to have their claims adjudicated.120 Since few Native American 
groups qualified as tribes or bands when they lost their aboriginal 
land,l2l such intent could only be satisfied by permitting groups of 
Native Americans to fall within the broad category of "other iden-
tifiable group. "122 Thus, the amorphous and ambiguous phrase "other 
identifiable group" was interpreted by the Court of Claims to encom-
pass a broader vision of Native American organization and affiliation 
to comport with the intent of Congress.123 
The second obstacle facing tribes that sought to bring aboriginal 
land claims before the Commission was determining the boundaries 
of the land owned by any identifiable group.124 Taking a much more 
lenient view of boundaries, the Commission required a showing that 
the tribe exclusively occupied and used the land in order to prevail. 125 
To facilitate and support the difficult and time-consuming fact-finding 
process, the Court of Claims appointed its clerk to research aboriginal 
land claims.126 However, even this expanded network of research 
proved insufficient to establish land boundaries.127 Consequently, to 
facilitate the establishment ofland boundaries, one ingenious attorney 
for the Pawnee tribe entered into a series of stipulations with the 
attorneys for adjoining tribes. 128 The attorneys agreed to draw lines 
around their claims where each tribe agreed to relinquish claim to 
ownership of land on the other's side of the line. 129 Through collabo-
ration, tribes definitively outlined the boundaries of their land, a feat 
that neither thorough investigation nor the true reality of aboriginal 
Native American life could accomplish.130 The Commission gave these 
stipulations considerable weight in the establishment of boundaries of 
119 See id. at 122-23 (discussing Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348 (1952». 
120 See id. 
m Seeid. at 119. Many Native American groups could not fit within the label "tribe" or "band" 
because they lacked a recognized government or leadership. See id. Among many Native Ameri-
cans, "governmental" decisions, such as land use and raiding, were made by extended family 
groups. See id. at 120. 
122 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 123. 
123 See id. at 122. 
124 See id. at 123-24. 
125 See id. at 126. 
126 See id. at 128. 
127 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 128. 
128 See id. at 128-29. 
129 See id. 
130 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 116-17, 128. 
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aboriginallands.13l Although such methods as these constituted a di-
vergence from the documentation and anthropological support of-
fered by many tribes, the key point the Commission was emphasizing 
was that weakness of proof should not result in dismissal of a suit if it 
was clear that a tribe exclusively occupied and used some of the land.132 
Difficulties of proof should not bar recovery but should only affect the 
amount of recovery received. 133 
Lieder and Page present a valid point of how the obstacles Native 
American tribes faced prevented effective administration of the Indian 
Claims Commission Act. However, many of the difficulties the Commis-
sion and Court of Claims encountered were typical of the practical 
application and interpretation of any new legislative act by the judici-
ary. In resolving the primary issues of who could bring suit and what 
they needed to prove, the Commission struggled to apply the Act but 
eventually they looked toward the intent of, rather than the language 
used by, the legislature to guide them in their determination of Native 
American claims. 134 
IV. THE VARIOUS CLAIMS BROUGHT BY INDIAN TRIBES BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION 
Many of the problems with the adjudication of the various claims 
brought by Native American tribes arose because of the inability of the 
Commission and the Government to comprehend the source of these 
claims.135 In the Native Americans' claims for uncompensated taking 
of land, they had to prove control over certain tracts of land and 
the unjust acquisition of this land by the Government. 136 Beyond over-
coming these obstacles, however, tribes still had to "walk through a 
minefield of liability-limiting rules."137 Once the tribes won a claim, the 
monetary awards they received were subject to offsets by the Govern-
ment. This permitted the Government to deduct amounts it expended 
for the support and maintenance of the tribes, while they resided on 
governmen t reservations, from the award. 138 These offsets proved to be 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 129. 
133 See id. 
134 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 122-23 (discussing Thompson v. United States, 122 
Ct. Cl. 348 (1952». 
135 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 265-69. 
136 See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 819. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. at 818-19. 
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particularly insulting to the Indian tribes because the offset items were 
often neither needed nor desired, especially the religious education 
provided by missionaries, and corresponded with the lack of trust and 
respect the tribes accorded the word of the Government. 139 The Com-
mission derived a formula for applying offsets to monetary awards. l4O 
Awards of those tribes who resisted the Government and signed a treaty 
only after a war would not be subject to offsets because the treaty could 
not be compared to a contract nor did it constitute partial compensa-
tion. l41 On the other hand, if a tribe voluntarily ceded land by treaty, 
offsets would be deducted from the award.142 The treaty of peace (no 
offsets allowed)/treaty of cession (offsets allowed) distinction empha-
sized the irony of the situation in that those who peacefully ceded their 
land to the Government would be liable for offsets while those tribes 
who resisted would not. l43 What was termed a treaty of peace really 
resulted from resistance and conflict while a treaty of cession took 
place peacefully.144 Ironically, the Government ultimately punished 
those tribes who believed them and cooperated with them for being 
gullible, while rewarding those tribes who stood their ground and 
resisted for being contrary. 
Along these same lines, the political division between aboriginal 
and legal title to land emphasized how little it paid to cooperate with 
and trust the Government. The Supreme Court held, in the landmark 
case involving the Tee-Hit-Tons of Alaska, that title is legally recognized 
if Congress or a treaty declares it permanently belongs to the Native 
Americans. l45 The Government would only be required to pay compen-
sation for recognized land. l46 Conversely, land without congressional 
recognition, or land not addressed in a treaty, was not a property right 
and thus not compensable. l47 While the Government may choose to 
protect the Native Americans' right of occupancy, it may terminate this 
right at any time and dispose of the lands without a legal obligation 
139 See id. at 819-20. 
140 See id. 
141 See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 819-20. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1955). 
146 See id. 
147 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 135; John Skinner, Native People, Foreign Laws: A 
Survey Comparing Aboriginal Title to Property in the United States and Australia, 19 SUFFOLK 
'ThANSNAT'L L. REv. 235, 240-42 (1995). 
1998] BOOK REVIEWS 311 
to compensate Native Americans. 148 Aboriginal title arose not from 
occupation for long periods of time but from the Government's post 
facto beneficence.149 Similarly, this concept guided the determinaton 
of whether interest would be applied to monetary awards. 150 The Su-
preme Court devised a method of determining when interest is due to 
Native Americans. 151 Acting as a sovereign and confiscating tribal land 
required the Government to pay interest but acting in its capacity as 
trustee and converting tribal land into money did not.152 Obviously, no 
interest would be owed for land not recognized by treaty or statute 
since compensation for the taking of such land was not even man-
dated. 153 
Considering the culture and spirit of the Native American people, 
perhaps the most troubling aspect of their land claims was the prereq-
uisite that they had to concede that they no longer owned their abo-
riginal land before their claim for uncompensated taking could be 
heard.154 As this was the only property-related claim the Commission 
recognized, Native American tribes faced the choice oflegally conced-
ing their lack of title in their land, or being unable to get their claims 
adjudicated. 155 But since what they ultimately hoped for was the resto-
ration of their land, and money was of little importance, there was little 
actual difference. 
In the Chiricahuas' land claim, based upon uncompensated tak-
ing of their aboriginal land, the tribe encountered numerous obstacles 
which they slowly but steadfastly overcame. 156 Reports of government 
agents who worked with the Chiricahua leader, Mangas Coloradas, 
148 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 135. 
149 See id. 
150 See Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 448 U.S. 371, 408-10 (1980). 
151 See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 822. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 825. 
154 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 186. The Indian Claims Commission could only grant 
money damages, therefore attorneys advised tribes to drop any claims for present possession of 
property even though they could prove the Government had not formally confiscated it. See 
Newton, Compensation, supra note 87, at 470. 
155 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 187-88. Although Congress possessed the supreme 
power to extinguish aboriginal title, Congress did not need to be involved. See United States v. 
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941). The Government's actions of taking land 
were not necessarily Congressional action, they were construed as the Executive Department's 
actions that had been ratified by Congress. See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 187. "If a tribe 
had brought a lawsuit contending that they still owned part or all of their aboriginal territory, 
any court would have concluded that Congress had ratified the president's actions." Id. at 188. 
156 See id. at 164-67. 
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verified that all the Indians identified as Chiricahuas were "identically 
the same people," overcoming a primary hurdle of tribal identifica-
tion.157 Next, the Chiricahuas' lawyers persuaded the Commission to 
reject the Government's "maximum habitat areas" argument to define 
the tribe's territory as those areas exclusively used and occupied by 
them for hunting and gathering purposes.158 Lastly, the Chiricahuas 
were able to establish the date of taking as the last event in the Apache 
resistance, Geronimo's surrender to the Government. 159 With these 
obstacles behind them, the Chiricahuas found themselves the recipi-
ents of a $16.5 million award. 160 
Although land claims comprised the largest portion of claims, 
accounting and mismanagement claims were brought by an increasing 
number oftribes.161 Most accounting reports recurringly demonstrated 
that the Government had expended some tribal funds to run the 
agency.162 But the complexity of the claims involving minute details 
over long periods of time rendered these cases virtually un triable .163 In 
light of the complex nature of these claims, settlement was encouraged 
and eventually became the norm. 164 Consequently, all tribes bringing 
accounting and mismanagement claims recovered something in the 
settlement of these cases. 165 
As with most accounting and mismanagement claims, the Chirica-
huas settled their claim against the Government.166 The Fort Sill 
Apaches did not have any tribal property or funds and while the 
Mescalero Apaches had tribal moneys and valuable forest resources, 
neither wanted to spend years litigating the case.167 The Government 
relied roughly on prior decisions to arrive at a $2 million settlement 
offer which the Mescalero Chiricahuas accepted.168 
157 See id. at 164. 
158 See id. at 165. 
159 See id. at 167. Generally, the later the valuation date, the higher the value for two reasons: 
first, prices of most commodities, including land, increased throughout most of this country's 
history; and second, miners, ranchers, and settlers developed new ways of using land previously 
thought unusable. See id. at 165. Also, the later the valuation date, the greater the likelihood that 
minerals discovered on the land in the late 1870s and early 1880s would have been discovered 
before the date of taking. See id. at 166. 
160 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 167. 
161 See id. at 246-47. 
162 See id. at 246. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 253. 
165 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 253-54. 
166 See id. at 253. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
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The underlying problem with all Indian claims was not the com-
plexity of the facts, but the nature of the trust relationship between 
the Government and Native American tribes. 169 The fiduciary relation-
ship symbolized the loss of Native American sovereignty which, up until 
the middle of the nineteenth century, ensured that they were treated 
as sovereign nations who were co-equals with the United States and 
European nations. 170 But with the advent of the "discovery doctrine" 
and the growing breadth and power of the United States, the sover-
eignty of Native Americans was usurped.17! 
The final blow came in the form of the Indian Department Ap-
propriations Act of 1871.172 The Act stripped all Indian nations or tribes 
within the United States of their status as independent nations or tribes 
with the power to contract with the United States by treaty. 173 With one 
sweeping act, the Government wiped away a whole people's worth and 
place in society and resigned them to the wardship of the government 
that disempowered them. Relegated to a position of inferiority and 
dependency, Native Americans were not only stripped of their rights 
as a sovereign nation but they were robbed of their freedom in a 
country founded on exactly that principle. 174 
As much as the devaluation of their status offended the Native 
Americans, more offensive was the evidence of their dependency.175 
Native Americans lost control over funds, resources, economic means, 
and education.176 The actual control the Government had over much 
of the managemen t of resources and decision-making capabilities that 
characterize a trust relationship 177 pushed Native Americans to the 
receiving end of the relationship where they finally realized that not 
only were they no longer their own people standing on equal ground 
as other nations, they were dependent on these nations for their 
livelihood. 
Finally, along with dependency and loss of sovereignty, the ine-
fficiencies of the fair and honorable dealings clause of the Indian 
Claims Commission Act178 compounded the feeling that Indians were 
169 See Lope, supra note 38, at 334-38. 
170 See id. at 333-34. 
17l See id. at 336. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
174 See Lope, supra note 38, at 331-38. 
175 See Newton, Courts of the Conqueror, supra note 3, at 805. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 804. 
178 See Indian Claims Commission Act § 2 (formerly codified at 25 U .S.C. §§70a, 1505, omitted 
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not fit to be afforded the basic decencies and autonomy humans 
deserved as a virtue of their mere existence. One such decency is to 
be free from unwarranted imprisonment. 179 Yet, not even the fair and 
honorable dealings clause could redress that claim.180 The Chiricahua 
Apaches' imprisonment claim was dismissed because it was an individ-
ual rather than a tribal claim and because the Government had not 
expressly undertaken a specific duty toward them by treaty, statute or 
agreement. 181 Such great effort was expended to circumvent the prin-
ciples of fairness and honesty that in the attempt to go around the 
issue the argument was already lost. The Commission found imprison-
ment to be of an individual nature rather than a tribal one but each 
person was not imprisoned for who they were but for the tribe they 
belonged to. By the end of their imprisonment in 1912, only six male 
participants in the outbreak of 1885 and 1886 were still living, while 
over half of the Chiricahuas were born into captivity.182 Is it even 
possible for innocent people who are born into captivity to be impris-
oned for who they were individually rather than for their affiliation 
with a tribal identity? 
As for the express agreement argument, the Government from the 
very beginning, through its actions, expressly agreed to give the Chiri-
cahuas a protected reservation in exchange for cession of their abo-
riginalland. 183 When the Government reneged on its promise, it osten-
sibly released the Chiricahuas from punishment due to resistance or 
actions motivated by self-preservation. If the Government is justified 
in taking action in complete opposition to that which it expressly 
agreed to take, it should be held accountable for actions taken yet 
never addressed at all. The fair and honorable dealings clause has 
tarnished the principles of fairness and honesty merely by offering 
such ludicrous arguments in its defense. 
from Code upon Commission termination on Sept. 30, 1978) quoted in LIEDER & PAGE, supra 
note I, at 67. 
179 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 218. 
180 See id. at 107. 
181 See id. at 209, 216-17. The Indian Claims Commission Act permitted claims to be brought 
"on behalf of any Indian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians." !d. at 
105. This meant that claims brought had to be tribal, not individual, in nature. See id. The reason 
for this interpretation was to prevent every individual Native American or his descendants from 
suing for every wrong committed against him such that the Indian Claims Commission would 
never finish its business. See id. 
182 See id. at 43. 
183 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note I, at 17-18. 
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The most important claim to the Chiricahuas was their imprison-
men t claim,184 partly because the primary source of their mal treatmen t 
flowed from their imprisonment, partly because it was the gravest blow 
to their autonomy, independence, and dignity. However, the imprison-
ment claim was dismissed quickly because only individuals could be 
imprisoned, not tribes. 185 Thus any claim for imprisonment must come 
from the individual. I86 The Chiricahua Apaches rephrased this claim 
to allege that they, as a tribe, sustained injury to their function as a 
tribe and won the battle to survive the Government's motion to dis-
miss.187 But as the tale of Native Americans goes, they ultimately lost 
the war.18B 
V. CONCLUSION 
At the close of a long and bitter war, the one belief and theory 
that still inspired Geronimo and his Chiricahua brothers was indeh, 
meaning dead. 189 In the face of immense Government opposition, 
many of the Chiricahua Apaches pronounced themselves dead. But as 
the fighting spirit raged on, indeh began to signifY wild justice. 190 Even 
with the ultimate realization that death lay in the horizon, the Chiri-
cahua Apaches approached death with the spirit of life and with the 
hope that justice was still obtainable. The dual facets of indeh signifY 
the spirit of the Chiricahuas-fighting to the death; fighting until 
justice is attained; fighting for a justice that only comes with resistance; 
justice in death. However one interprets it, until the Government can 
begin to see and acljust the law to reflect the reality that for one group 
of Native American people, notions of death and justice can come from 
the same source, there will never be an end to Native American claims 
and justice will remain wild. 
184 See id. at 108. 
185 See id. at 107. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. at 111. 
188 See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 1, at 111. 
189 See id. at 4. 
190 See id. at 24. 

